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A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort:
Limiting Interference with Contract Beyond
the Unlawful Means Test
DONALD C. DOWLING, JR.*
This article examines the history of interference with contract and
tortious interference with business relations. It distinguishes the two
actions and separates them on the basis that one is grounded in tort
law while the other is predicated on contract law. The article con-
cludes by suggesting a limit on the interference actions.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE OVER-BREADTH OF
THE INTERFERENCE ACTIONS
The history of tort law in the twentieth century is one of expan-
sion.1 Historically, those who have argued against the spread of lia-
bility have often done so in vain.2 One area which may escape this
trend, however, is the interference torts-tortious interference with
contract and tortious interference with business relations. The prima
facie cases for these actions are no broader now than they were in the
mid-nineteenth century.3 Nevertheless, writers today, like writers
then, consistently agree the causes of action are too broad.' The over-
riding apprehension, then as well as now, is that allowing someone
who lost money on a business deal to sue a third party who caused the
loss could lead to the destruction of modem business,5 competition,6
and contract law.7
1. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, P. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS §§ 1-6, at 1-34 (5th ed. 1984) (describing the historical rise and expansion of tort
liability and damages) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; see also Palmer, Why Privity
Entered Tort-An Historical Re-examination of Winterbottom v. Wright, 27 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 85 (1983) (describing the nineteenth century rise of the negligence action).
2. See, e.g., E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-19 (1948) (analyzing
the breakdown of the inherently dangerous rule and the rise of modem products liability).
3. Compare Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 753 (Q.B. 1853) (defining the malice limit
on interference with contract) with infra text accompanying notes 22-26 (discussing the
modern malice standard).
4. For a detailed argument that social concerns require the drastic limitation of the
interference torts, see Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 335 (1980). See also Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (1980)
(arguing that the confusion of case law in the interference tort area requires restriction of the
actions).
5. See Dobbs, supra note 4, at 367-68 (examining the effects of the interference actions
relating to misuse of economic power). See generally Note, Tortious Interference with Conduct
of a Business, 56 YALE L.J. 886 (1947) (examining the business effects of the interference
actions).
6. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 130, at 1012-15 (discussing the privilege and
effect of competition in the interference tort context); see also infra note 42.
7. See generally Perlman, supra note 4, at 65 (closely analyzing the effects of contract law
on interference with contract and business relations).
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A. Comparison to Heart-Balm Legislation
Not only are the policy arguments for restricting the interference
torts strong, the historical precedent is also significant. What is prob-
ably the best modern example of restricting tort liability deals with an
action closely related to the interference torts: criminal conversation.8
Through heart-balm legislation, many states have limited or abolished
actions for criminal conversation, alienation of affections, and breach
of contract to marry.9 These actions essentially allowed recovery for
tortious interference with the marriage contract and for tortious inter-
ference with personal relations.
Although prevalent under common law, the family law torts
proved too severe for modem American society. 0 Because the family
law torts include added dangers of allowing extortion11 and permit-
ting possible constitutional violations,12 the reasons for restricting the
interference with contract and business relations torts, admittedly, do
not seem as compelling as those behind the heart-balm statutes.
13
Otherwise, however, the analysis is similar. In one sense, liability for
interference with contract is less justified than even the alienation of
affections action. In the business realm the injured party may still sue
under the contract, but under the heart-balm statutes the rejected
lover has no remedy at all.14
8. Criminal conversation, a tort based on sexual infidelity, in fact may have grown out of
the intentional interference with business tort. See Dobbs, supra note 4, at 341; see also Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 667 n. 12 (1923) (discussing criminal
conversation in the context of the interference torts).
9. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 299-301
(1983). See generally id. at 301.
10. [T]he law clearly should not hold the inducer [of breach of contract to marry]
liable; for the fiancee's interest in the protection of his promised advantages from
interference by third persons is far outweighed by the strong social interest in
general freedom to enter marriage contracts, combined with the individual
interests of the inducer and the girl in freedom to enter into advantageous
relations with others.
Sayre, supra note 8, at 687.
11. An argument exists that these family law torts conflict with principles in the due
process clause. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 9, at 300.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766A, 766B (1979). These sections
define a prima face case for the interference torts and each section specifically excepts contracts
to marry.
13. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 9, at 299-300. In passing heart-balm
statutes, "legislatures ... acted out of concern that the danger of punitive and excessive jury
verdicts might lead to extortion." Id. at 299. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 129, at 933 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing family law tort policy in the context of the
interference torts).
14. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 129, at 933 (discussing the family law
cause of action in this context). But see Perlman, supra note 4, at 73 (arguing that the family
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B. Prima Facie Elements of the Interference Actions
The prima facie cases for interference with contract and interfer-
ence with business relations are quite similar to each other.'I In both,
the plaintiff must first prove that a valid contract or business relation-
ship16 existed. Second, he must prove that the defendant, a third
party, knew or should have known 7 of the contract or relationship.
Lastly, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted to disrupt the
contract or relationship, and that this act was in fact disruptive, caus-
ing damages."8 Because the two interference torts are so similar,
many courts have essentially combined them.' 9 Because the plaintiff
relationship acts as a limit on the family law torts, thus the business interference actions are
potentially more dangerous, because the class of possible plaintiff's is much broader).
15. According to Dean Prosser, "[e]ssentially, no different principle [between the
interference tort] is involved, and it is chiefly as a matter of convenience that the case of
inducing breach of contract are considered as a [separate] group." W. PROSSER, supra note 13,
§ 129, at 931. Compare ABA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR BUSINESS TORT LITIGATION
§ 1.03 (1980) with id. § 2.20 (giving the prima facie case of the interference with contract and
interference with "prospective advantage" actions) [hereinafter cited as MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]. For recent overviews of the prima facie elements of these actions, see
Bradford, Protection Against Intentional Breach of Contract Remedies in Tort, 44 ALA. LAW.
320 (1984); Watson, Business Torts-A Brief Survey, FLA. B. TRIAL LAW. SEC. NEWSLETTER,
June 1984, at 17.
16. That is, a business relationship "with the probability of future economic benefit,"
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.20 (1980), or a business relationship which rises to the level
of a "prospective contractual relation," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
The Restatement takes an approach different from the one discussed here, but this difference is
beyond the scope of this discussion. For an analysis of the Restatement approach, see Perlman,
supra note 4, at 67-69.
17. For a thorough discussion of the knowledge element, see Dryden v. Tri-Valley
Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct. App. 1977); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 1, § 129, at 982. Some decisions seem to treat the thirdparty element as a
threshold standing analysis, but it is clearer as an element of the prima facie case. See, e.g.,
Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir. 1976) (the interference tort
arises when the defendant is a third person who is not a party to the contract); Anderson v.
Minter, 32 Ohio St. 2d 207, 291 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1972) (plaintiff alleging interference with an
employment contract does not state a claim a supervisor acting as an agent of the employer,
who is a party to the contract).
18. For statements of the interference torts' prima facie cases which embody these
elements, see MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 15, §§ 1.03, 2.30 (1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766A, 766B (1979). Many cases contain similar
lists of elements. See, e.g., Seven D. Enters. Ltd. v. Fonzi, 438 F. Supp. 161, 163 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Richardson v. La Rancherita of La Jolla, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 73, 80, 159 Cal. Rptr.
285, 288 (Ct. App. 1979); Livoti v. Elston, 52 A.D.2d 444, 446, 384 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (App.
Div. 1976). For a detailed discussion of each of the prima facie case elements, see Comment,
Contractual Relations: When Are They Also A Tort? 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 689-98 (1976).
19. The classic statement of this point is in Zimmerman v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, 12 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1961) (Tobriner, J.). In Zimmerman,
the court reasoned "[t]he nature of the [interference with business relations] tort does not vary
with the legal strength, or enforceability, of the relation disrupted. The actionable wrong lies
in the inducement to break the contract or sever the relationship, not in the kind of contract or
relationship so disrupted .. " Id. at 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21. See infra note 20; see also
1986] INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
could just as likely recover under the business relations action, even if
a contract technically does not exist under current law, courts tend
not to inquire into the existence or validity of any alleged contract.2"
Therefore the defendant, a third party to the alleged contract, would
usually not bother to raise a contract law defense such as lack of con-
sideration or the statute of frauds.2 1
Except in those situations in which the defendant can argue that
the plaintiff's alleged relations were too tenuous to merit legal protec-
tion, interference cases rarely turn on the element of existence of a
contract or business relation in a prima facie case. The element of the
prima facie case most often in dispute is the one requiring that the
defendant intentionally acted to destroy a contract or business rela-
tion which he knew existed.22 Traditionally courts have imposed a
"malice standard" requiring that the plaintiff prove the defendant
acted not only intentionally but also with malice.23 Because, however,
in almost all interference cases the alleged interference appears to ben-
efit the defendant, thus allowing a court to label the defendant's intent
as malice and find liability, the malice standard is virtually inoper-
able.24 Therefore, most theories which limit the scope of the interfer-
ence torts attempt to replace malice with a less manipulable limit.
25
Still, the element of the prima facie case dealing with the nature of the
Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 994, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723 (Ct. App.
1977) ("[ilt is likewise settled that the tort of interference with contract is merely a species of
the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage; and while the elements
of the two actions are similar, the existence of a legally binding agreement is not a sine qua non
to the maintenance of a suit based on the more inclusive wrong").
20. "[T]ortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with a business
relationship are basically the same cause of action. The only material difference appears to be
that in one there is a contract and in the other there is only a business relationship." Smith v.
Ocean State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
21. The classic examination of this issue is in Zimmerman, 191 Cal. App. 2d 55, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 196 1) (Torbiner, J.). The defendant argued the statute of frauds protected
him, as well as the second party to the contract. Id. at 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320. The court
rejected this defense on the ground that the defendant's status was different from that of the
other contracting party. Id. at 60-61, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 129, at 932 ("[t]he agreement need not, however, be enforceable by the plaintiff as a
contract").
22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23. The malice standard seems to have begun with dictum in Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng.
Rep. 749, 753 (Q.B. 1853) (discussed infra Part II). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, § 129, at 980-82; W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 129, at 927, 928, 930, 931, 938
(discussing the historical rise and the ideological inadequacy of the malice standard).
24. See Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century:
The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1527 (1980)
(expressing a general disfavor with the malice standard on the ground that it is imprecise and
manipulable).
25. The leading example is the suggestion of an "unlawful means test" in Perlman, supra
note 4, at 62 (discussed infra in Part IV). See also Dobbs, supra note 4, at 365 (proposing a
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defendant's intent remains a primary aspect of the interference torts.
This is the most crucial issue in most interference litigation. It is at
the heart of the ideological debate concerning the interference
actions.
26
C. Scope of the Present Discussion
The question of the defendant's intent, then, defines the general
scope of the present inquiry. The following three sections of this dis-
cussion support the thesis that to determine a workable limit on the
interference torts, that is, to find a substitute for the malice standard,
the torts must be considered separately.27 The existence of an
enforceable contract in an interference with contract action should
legally distinguish that action from interference with business rela-
tions, in which an injured party has no alternate remedy at all. There-
fore, the second section of this discussion examines the rise of the
interference torts in the English common law and suggests that,
notwithstanding the modern idea that interference with contract is
more justified than the business relations action,28 the earliest forms of
this tort did not involve binding contracts. 29  The section also
describes the current confusion in interference law, which may have
arisen because of the conflict between the historical and modern con-
cepts of the interference torts.
The third section of this discussion outlines an economic argu-
ment for analytically separating the two torts on the basis of the dif-
ferences between the contract and tort law inherent in each of the
interference actions. This section proposes that the initial inquiry in
any interference case should be the same as the primary inquiry in a
contract case: is there a valid contract?
The fourth section encompasses these preceding arguments and
suggests a specific workable limit for the interference actions. This
limit modifies a recent proposal30 that an "unlawful means test" limit
the interference torts.31 This final section summarizes the economic
rationale for the unlawful means test, and proposes a modification
limit on the interference actions similar to the unlawful means test); Note, supra note 24, at
1529-39 (theorizing that a loose balancing test came to replace the malice standard).
26. See supra note 25.
27. This thesis opposes the modern concept that these torts are essentially the same and
the only difference is that one requires proof of a contract and the other requires proof of a
business relationship. See supra notes 15 and 20.
28. See supra notes 15, 20 and 27.
29. See infra Part II.
30. Perlman, supra note 4, at 78. See generally supra note 25, and infra Part IV,
(examining Professor Perlman's "unlawful means test").
31. See supra note 30.
[Vol. 40:487
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
based on the theory that the two interference torts are conceptually
distinct because interference with contract more directly conflicts
with the policies supporting contract law.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERFERENCE ACTIONS
A. The Lumley Theory of Tortious Interference
The history of the two interference torts provides the basis for
the notion that the contract action is analytically separate from the
business relations tort. Recent discussions of the torts presuppose
that Lumley v. Gye,32 an important interference case, first established
the interference with contract action and that post-Lumley courts
extended the tort to protect contracts-at-will and even prospective
relations.33 This view relies on the theory that the business relation
action is looser and less justified than the interference with contract
tort.34 After all, the requirement of a contract would seem to elimi-
nate spurious claims, wherein the parties to the alleged relationship
have only minimal contact with each other.35 Notwithstanding this
reasoning, during the twentieth century the business and contract
torts ultimately merged. Given the validity of tortious interference
with a business relationship, the Lumley requirement of a contract
effectively disappeared.36
The prevailing explanation 37 for the historical rise of this situa-
tion might be called the Lumley theory of tortious interference. Only
a few preliminary judicial inquiries into the interference area existed
in the English common law before the Lumley v. Gye decision of
32. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
33. See Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of Society's Interest in
Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1491-92 (1981)
(arguing that "tortious interference with contract (is] the historical precursor of such liability"
as liability for "intentional interference with prospective or unformalized relations"); see also
Note, supra note 24, at 1529 (the interference tort "had been extended to protect at will
contracts and even prospective relations") (emphasis added).
34. This concept-that a contract is more worthy of judicial protection than is a business
relation-seems to have originated in Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715 (1893). The
Temperton plaintiff sued under both interference with contract and interference with business
relations. Id. at 719-20. The court held the interference with contract claim was insufficient
on the basis of the trial evidence. Id. at 720. The court also refused to recognize an action for
interference with business relations. Id. at 722.
35. Case law shows, however, that the strength of the alleged relationship between the two
parties does not always correspond to the strength of the plaintiff's claim. In Studley, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., the plaintiff made out a strong interference with business relations claim,
although the second party to the relationship never knew of the plaintiff's existence. 386 F.2d
161 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. See supra notes 19 and 20.
37. See supra note 33.
1986]
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1853. 3 Certainly, no American case before Lumley unequivocally
allowed tortious interference with contract. 39  After Lumley, the
interference action eventually became a part of the English common
law. It spread to the United States4' and the requirement of a con-
tract gradually disintegrated, allowing a mere business relationship to
sustain a cause of action.4
As the tort began to function in twentieth century America, it
quickly conflicted with the capitalist tenet of competition.42 To pro-
tect free enterprise, American courts allowed "lawful competition"
43
as a defense privilege; the tort as stated in the Lumley opinions proved
too broad to exist unchecked in a free enterprise economy. 4 Possibly
as a result of this danger, lawyers came only rarely to invoke the inter-
ference actions. Recently such actions, however, have become "fash-
ionable"4 causes of action. Nonetheless, the history of the torts is
38. "Traditional teaching about the development of the tort of interference with
contractual relations maintains that it emerged in 1853 with the landmark case of Lumley v.
Gye." Note, supra note 24, at 1510. See also id. at n. I (listing citations that recognize Lumley
as the leading case in the area of tortious interference with contract). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 13, § 129, at 927 (Professor Prosser's misstatement of history, that "the
recognition that economic relations are entitled to protection against unreasonable
interference is on the whole a comparatively recent development.").
39. According to Professor Sayre, the interference doctrine arose with Lumley and "from
England has emigrated to the United States." Sayre, supra note 8, at 671. At least one
American court, however, fully recognized interference with contract 25 years before Lumley.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-86 (discussing Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall 210 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1828)).
40. See supra note 39.
41. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 64 (arguing that post-Lumley courts "extended"
interference with contract "to prospective relationships not yet formalized into contract").
42. "It is startling that a doctrine of this sort [liability for tortious interference] is
superimposed on an economic order committed to competition." Perlman, supra note 4, at
78. See also id. at 62 ("offering someone a better deal may interfere with an existing contract,
but it is also the essence of a free market"). See generally supra note 6.
43. Much has been written on the lawful competition defense privilege, and the content of
these treatments is beyond the scope of the present discussion. For a detailed examination of
this area, see generally Ahem v. Boeing Co., 701 F.2d 142, 143 (11th Cir. 1983); DeVoto v.
Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1980); Insurance Field Servs.,
Inc. v. White & White Inspection & Audit Serv., Inc., 384 So. 2d 303, 306-07 (Fla. 5th DCA
1980); Supreme Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 130 I11. App. 2d 16, 21, 265 N.E.2d 857, 860
(App. Ct. 1970); Rudolf v. Huntington Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 91 Misc. 2d 264, 265-66,
397 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864-65 (App. Term 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 767-769
(1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 130, at 1012-15; W. PROSSER, supra note 13,
§ 129, at 932, 946; Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728,
745-62 (1928).
44. See Note, supra note 24, at 1527-28 (arguing the malice standard over-expands the
interference torts); see also Dobbs, supra note 4, at 357 (arguing that "courts have been in an
expansive mood for a long time," and that in the context of interference actions this mood
does "more harm than good").
45. Wackenhut Corp. v. Maimone, 389 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) ("[t]he tort
of intentional interference with a contractual or business relationship has of late emerged from
[Vol. 40:487
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actually quite different from this Lumley theory, and this difference
might provide a solution to the generally acknowledged problem that
the scope of the torts is too broad.
B. Early Common Law Roots of the Interference Actions
1. THE LANDLORD/TENANT AND MASTER/SERVANT ACTIONS
The roots of the interference torts go back well before Lumley
into the English Year Books,46 which established two separate but
analytically similar interference causes of action.47 One rule4 dates
from the eighth year of Henry VII's reign and allowed a landlord to
sue anyone who enticed his tenants to move away.49 This rule applied
to tenancies-at-will, which either party could legally terminate at any
time.50 In a tenancy-at-will the tenant was free to leave and the land-
lord had no recourse against him. Consequently, the law allowed the
landlord to sue any third party who had enticed the tenant away.5 1 In
modem terms, the law allowed actions for intentional interference
with a business relationship; because the tenancy agreement was ter-
minable-at-will, it was a mere relationship, not a binding contract. 2
Although contemporary hornbook contract law did not exist at this
early date, 3 because the landlord had no recourse against his tenant,
the law provided a remedy against a third party who was at fault.
A second interference rule dating from this same period arose
from the English Ordinance of Labourers 4 in 1349. At that time, a
plague had created a labor shortage which was so severe that Parlia-
relative obscurity to provide a quite fashionable basis for contemporary law suits") (emphasis
added). As late as 1978 a California court, however, allowed the interference torts to be
described as "infrequently invoked." Worldwide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehalf Corp., 84 Cal.
App. 3d 803, 809, 149 Cal. Rptr. 42, 45 (Ct. App. 1978).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-58.
47. Professor Sayre traces the interference action even farther, to ancient Rome. Sayre,
supra note 8, at 663-64.
48. For a brief discussion of the landlord/tenant action for enticement and its origins, see
Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall 210, 215-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
49. Y.B. 9 Hen. 8 pl. 8.
50. Id. See Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall 210, 212 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
51. See supra note 50.
52. See id.; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 129, at 929 (the "family tree [of
interference with contract] goes back to very ancient times, when it was not the existence of a
contract which was important, but the status, or relation recognized by the law, in which the
parties stood toward one another, and with which the defendant interfered").
53. See generally G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 11-15 (1974) (arguing
contract law as it is currently perceived did not develop until the nineteenth century).
54. 23 Edw. III (1349). The common law before 1349 has provided a similar enticement
remedy, but only where the defendant had used actual violence. Sayre, supra note 8, at 665.
For another discussion of this very early development, see generally Comment, Interference
with Contractual and Business Relations in Alabama, 34 ALA. L. REV. 599, 599-601 (1983).
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ment passed a statute making liable an employer who enticed a ser-
vant away from another employer.55 This "enticement" tort then
merged with the existing body of English common labor law.56 It
applied, however, to employment situations which were terminable-
at-will, not to contractual employment relationships.5 Like the land-
lord/tenant-at-will cause of action, in modem terms this was an
action for tortious interference with business relations. The proof
requirement for the existence of the relationship was similar to the
modem requirement, but stricter.5"
2. ROOTS OF THE INTERFERENCE ACTION IN
THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
The early common and statutory law did not allow a cause of
action for interference with enforceable contracts.59 Yet early law did
allow a plaintiff to sue for interference with business relations which
arose out of either a landlord/tenant or a master/servant relationship,
the two dominant business relationships of the era.6°  As business
began to develop in the nineteenth century,61 pressure on the courts
may have increased to expand the tort. Even earlier, in 1793, an Eng-
lish court had quietly extended the business relations action to the
55. Sayre, supra note 8, at 665-66; Note, supra note 24, at 1515 n.22.
56. See supra note 55; see also Pingrey, Interference of Third Parties in the Contracts of
Others, 48 CENT. L.J. 112 (1899) (summarizing the post-Lumley development of the master/
servant enticement action).
57. "[T]here was no requirement that the master, as plaintiff, prove the existence of a
contract between himself and his servant. Instead, the master had merely to show that a
'subsisting' relation of service existed." Note, supra note 24, at 1515. A modem case reaffirms
that employment-at-will situations come under the interference with business relations action.
Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). See generally infra note 112.
The law in this area is changing, however, as states abrogate or modify their employment-at-
will doctrines and recognize a public policy exception or a wrongful discharge tort. As one
state supreme court recently explained, "[w]hile we believe that considerations of public policy
do not demand total abandonment of the employment-at-will doctrine, . . . there are
occasions when exceptions to the general rule are recognized in the interests of justice." Mers
v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 103, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153-54 (1985). The present
analysis, however, considers only the traditional employment-at-will doctrine.
58. To establish the relation under the "enticement" tort, the master had to show that the
servant had begun the work relationship. See Note, supra note 24, at 1515. This requirement
did not exist in actions for interference with contract. Failure to meet this requirement was an
obstacle to the Lumley majority because the second party to the contract, an opera singer, had
not sung at his theater and, thus, had never begun her employment with the plaintiff. The
court, nevertheless, held for the plaintiff. See infra note 96.
59. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 130, at 1005. See generally Note, supra note 24.
60. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 130, at 1005-06. This discussion
goes further, stating that other common business relations in this period may also have been
protected. Id.
61. See Note, supra note 24, at 1511-21 (describing the historical and social factors which
gave rise to Lumley).
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commercial sector.62
The plaintiff in Tarleton v. M'Gawley63 owned a ship which he
sent to Africa to trade with the "natives."' Once at the African
coast, the ship captain sent a boat ashore to trade.65 A group of Afri-
cans who wanted to trade paddled a canoe out to meet the ship's
boat.66 Before the two groups could meet, the defendant, the captain
of another English ship, fired a cannon at the canoe, killing one of the
Africans and succeeding in disrupting the plaintiff's trading. 67
Apparently, the court found the defendant's motives were mali-
cious. 68 According to the case report,69 the defendant's attorney
relied on one main defense: the plaintiff had violated African law in
attempting to trade without acquiring from the local African king the
required trading license.70 The defense attorney compared the
defendant's disruptive cannon shot with the act of "alarming the
owner of a house which the plaintiff was about to break into."7 Prob-
ably because the attorney did not argue lack of common law prece-
dent for this kind of action, the court issued a short opinion which
dismissed the defense as irrelevant and found for the plaintiff, holding
the licensing requirement was "a foreign law; the act of trading is not
itself immoral. 72
Although the Tarleton opinion does not address the legal issue of
interference,73 its only innovation would seem to be an expansion of
the scope of then existing interference tort law. Because the plaintiff
had not yet met the group of Africans, and hence there was no con-
tract, the defendant's interference was with business relations and not
with a contract. Without saying so, Tarleton extended the landlord/
tenant and master/servant interference causes of action into the com-
mercial sector. Tarleton did not address, however, interference with a
valid contract.
62. Tarleton v. M'Gawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
63. Id. For a discussion of Tarleton in its socio-legal context, see Lever, Means, Motives,
and Interests in the Law of Torts, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 52 (A. Guest ed.
1961).




68. Id. According to the case report, the defendant fired "maliciously intending to hinder
and deter the natives from trading."




73. Tarleton, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
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C. The Rise of the Action for Interference with
an Enforceable Contract
1. Aldridge v. Stuyvesant
Thirty-five years later an American court did allow an action for
interference with contract. Aldridge v. Stuyvesant74 presented a land-
lord/tenant problem, but unlike the tenancies in the earlier cases, the
A ldridge lease was a binding contract for one year, rather than a ten-
ancy-at-will.75 Under the facts of Aldridge, A, the landlord, rented a
house to B.76 During the first month of the tenancy, C, a third party,
"wrongfull[y] and malicious[ly] threat[ened] ' ' 77 the tenants, saying
"that he would levy and seize their goods" 78 unless they moved out.
C's threat worked and the tenants broke the lease and moved. Unable
to mitigate his damages by finding another tenant, A sued C for inten-
tionally interfering with the lease contract. The defense carefully dis-
tinguished the tenancy-at-will rule and argued that absolutely no
precedent existed to support an action for interference with an
enforceable contract. 79 The defense reasoned that the tenancy contin-
ued throughout the year,80 so "the conduct of the defendant would
have formed no defense to an action brought against the tenants by
the plaintiff to recover the rent."'"
This argument depended on the premise that by freely entering a
contract with the tenant, the landlord had established an enforceable
basis of liability against the tenant and therefore he should be pre-
cluded from shopping for another defendant. 2 Under this reasoning,
a contract is not a property right which a party creates in isolation of
his business dealings. Instead, it is a planned course of action which a
party agrees to take if an event occurs-such as the breaching of the
lease in Aldridge. The cause of the event was irrelevant to the
defense. The tenant could have broken the lease for any reason what-
soever-that a third party happened to advise him to do so should not
have been legally relevant.83
74. 1 Hall 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).




79. Id. at 212. "Upon referring to the Year Book, ... it will be found that the tenants
spoken of were tenants at will . . . .[Blecause the tenants here [are] tenants for years...
they remain bound by their contract with the landlord, and he has a perfect remedy to enforce
a performance of the contract." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 211.
82. Id. at 211-12. See supra note 79.
83. The court, in Ashley v. Harrison, adopted this rationale in denying a cause of action
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In rejecting this defense, the Aldridge court held the lease con-
tract to be a property interest belonging to the landlord. The' defend-
ant had interfered with this property and was therefore liable, just as
a defendant could be liable for violating a property right in trespass.
This is the same reasoning that an English court used twenty-five
years later in Lumley v. Gye.8 4 The Lumley court was almost cer-
tainly not aware of the Aldridge holding,"5 and so apparently reached
its conclusion independently.
2. Lumley v. Gye
While Aldridge expanded the early common law cause of action
for interference with a tenancy-at-will,8 6 Lumley addressed the other
early common law action, enticement of a servant employed at will.
87
Although Lumley does not extend the law materially farther than
Aldridge did, one reason Lumley quickly became the landmark case in
this area 88 may be that it expressly overruled two prior cases with
almost identical facts.89
All three of these cases dealt with a theater manager who had
hired an opera singer. The singers' contracts in all three situations
were for specified periods and were therefore legally enforceable,
unlike contracts terminable-at-will. 90 In each case a third person's
act prevented performance of the contract, causing a breach. In each
case the theater owner sued the third party for interference with the
singer's contract. 91 The earlier two opinions refused to allow the
cause of action because the defendants' alleged interference was too
for interference with a valid contract. 170 Eng. Rep. 276 (K.B. 1793). The court reasoned the
breach of contract "might have proceeded from another cause, or perhaps from caprice or
insolence." Id. at 276.
84. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
85. Lumley does not mention Aldridge, and the dissent in Lumley states that "we have no
decisions upon" the interference with contract action. Id. at 762. See supra note 102.
Surprisingly, Aldridge did not seem to make an impact on its own state's law. A 1924 article
about the potential effects of Lumley on New York law does not mention Aldridge. Note,
Torts: Inducement to Breach of Contract: Doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, 9 CORNELL L. REV.
352 (1924).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53 and 74-83.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58.
88. Lumley became a topic for intellectual debate among nineteenth century legal scholars.
See, e.g., Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Justice Holmes (Sept. 17, 1897), 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 78, 80 (M. Howe ed. 1944).
89. Taylor v. Neri, 170 Eng. Rep. 393 (C.P. 1795); Ashley v. Harrison, 170 Eng. Rep.
276 (K.B. 1793). Note that both cases are earlier than Aldridge, so the Lumley court could
have cited Aldridge as an American trend away from the Taylor and Ashley holdings.
90. 118 Eng. Rep. at 750; 170 Eng. Rep. at 393; 170 Eng. Rep. at 276.
91. See supra note 90.
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remote.92 To allow the action could open the proverbial 93 floodgates,
and could conceivably allow a lawsuit every time a "servant, whether
domestic or not, was kept away a day from his master's business."
94
These first two opera singer cases barred the plaintiffs' action, then,
because the judges adopted the "status" concept of contract over the
"contract-as-property" notion. 95
Lumley, however, changed this.96 Lumley did to the worker
interference cases what A ldridge had done to the landlord/tenant
rule; it allowed an action when the plaintiff had entered a valid con-
tract. The language of the opinions in Lumley indicates, however,
that the judges saw their holding not only as allowing an action for
interference with a valid contract, but also as extending the old
master/servant enticement action into the area of nonmenial labor.
97
A major hurdle for the Lumley court was characterizing a "dramatic
artiste" 98 as a "servant. ' 99
The lengthy Lumley dissent by Justice Coleridge," foresaw the
implications the majority's holding could have on contract law. Jus-
tice Coleridge accepted the common law action for interference with
an employment relation, but he was unwilling to extend it to enforcea-
ble contracts, under the theory "that in respect to breach of contract
the general rule of our law is to confine [contractual] remedies by
92. 170 Eng. Rep. at 394; 170 Eng. Rep. at 276.
93. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 351, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) (comparing the potential reach of a defendant's liability in
negligence to the potential damage of downstream property after a dam breaks).
94. 170 Eng. Rep. at 394.
95. The Ashley court implicitly adopted the "status" theory in its dictum that the opera
singer could have breached the contract for any reason; that a third party happened to breach
should not be determinative. See supra note 83.
96. 118 Eng. Rep. at 753. Much of the Lumley opinion addresses a rule from the master/
servant enticement cases requiring that the servant have begun work before the plaintiff can
maintain an action. See supra note 57. This requirement seems merely to have had an
evidentiary function providing assurance that some actual master/servant relationship existed.
Because the action was on an unenforceable, at-will agreement, the law needed some
noncontractual requirement for a relationship, just as the modem interference with business
relations action requires some definite standard. See tnfra Part IV.
97. 118 Eng. Rep. at 752.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court dealt at some length with the issue of whether "the engagement of a
theatrical performer. . . is not of such a nature as to make the performer a servant, within the
rule of law which gives an action to the master for the wrongful enticing away of his servant."
Id. See generally Sayre, supra note 8, at 667-68 (discussing the "dramatic artiste is not a
servant" defense in Lumley).
100. 118 Eng. Rep. at 759. According to Professor Sayre, "[olf the four opinions rendered
in the case, the dissenting opinion of Justice Coleridge far outshines the other three for its
ability and scholarship." Sayre, supra note 8, at 668.
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action to the contracting parties."101 Justice Coleridge was so frus-
trated that he resorted to the argument that if the majority was cor-
rect, then why did no "treatise on the law of contract [have] ...a
chapter on this" action?1 °2
D. Examples of the Modern Applications of
the Interference Actions
1. REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND ATTORNEYS
Justice Coleridge's arguments did not catch hold, however, and
after Lumley an amorphous body of law grew up around the tortious
interference concept. 10 3 Even Justice Coleridge's argument concern-
ing the dearth of relevant scholarly literature soon became obsolete;
and by the early twentieth century courts upholding the interference
tort could find support in the contracts treatises of the day.1" The
interference torts soon expanded into a myriad of business situations.
For example, they proved especially useful to real estate brokers and
lawyers trying to collect contingent fees.
The real estate broker cases typically involve an agent who
arranges a sale between a buyer and a seller, but where the parties
consummate the sale independently, preventing the broker from col-
lecting his commission.105 These cases often involve a conflict
between contract and tortious interference law, because the broker
101. 118 Eng. Rep. at 760.
102. Id. at 761-62 ("[n]one of this reasoning applies to the case of breach of contract: if it
does, I should be glad to know how any treatise on the law of contract could be complete
without a chapter on this head, or how it happens we have no decisions on it").
103. Professor Sayre refers to the post-Lumley interference law as in a state of "constant
uncertainty." Sayre, supra note 8, at 669. For cases establishing the early growth of the post-
Lumley interference actions, see Note, Torts-Interference with Contract-Effect of Motive, 12
MINN. L. REV. 147 (1927).
104. See, e.g., Dade Enters. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 73, 160 So. 209, 210
(1935) (citing 4 W.H. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2426 (1920) for the proposition that
the victim of a breach of contract "may also maintain an action against the wrongdoer who
induced such breach"). According to the 1920 Page treatise, "[t]he weight -of modem
authority holds that interference with any contract amounts to a tort." 4 W.H. Page, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2426, at 4298 (1920).
105. See, e.g., R.C. Hilton Assoc. v. Stan Musial & Biggies, Inc., 702 F.2d 907 (11th Cir.
1983) (broker not entitled to collect commission when he had neither a contract nor a business
relationship with the seller); Studley, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 386 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1967)
(facts create a jury question concerning defendant's tortious interference with broker's
commission arrangement); Allen v. Powell, 248 Cal. App. 2d 502, 56 Cal. Rptr. 715 (Ct. App.
1967) (holding a broker may recover for tortious interference if the defendants conspired to
circumvent the commission agreement); Katz v. Thompson, 19 Misc. 2d 848, 189 N.Y.S.2d
982 (Co. Ct. 1959) (broker may collect from buyer notwithstanding that the broker did not
attempt to recover on his contract with seller).
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will frequently sue the seller in contract and the buyer in tort.0 6 At
least one case has explicitly held that interference is a wrong
independent of the breach; therefore, the plaintiff may sue both par-
ties, and the buyer cannot defend on the theory that the plaintiff must
first proceed in contract against the seller. 107
Similarly, the cases involving attorney contingent fees 108 often
involve a lawyer proceeding against a defendant who allegedly set-
tled a pending law suit directly with a client. The lawyer alleges
either the settlement prevented him from collecting his fee, or it pre-
vented him from pursuing the case to its full value.° 9 A variation of
this fact pattern is where one law firm alleges that another takes its
client.110 The defendant firm can be liable for tortious interference if
the evidence shows the defendant firm knowingly enticed the client.111
2. CONTRACTS TERMINABLE-AT-WILL
A more analytically complex pattern among current tortious
interference cases is the contracts terminable-at-will issue, which has
remained a subject of litigation since the Ordinance of Labourers in
1349.112 Although the older view states that a plaintiff may not
recover under an interference action alleging a terminable-at-will rela-
tionship,1' 3 in tort actions most modern courts treat contracts termi-
106. See supra note 105.
107. See Katz v. Thompson, 19 Misc. 2d 848, 189 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Co. Ct. 1959).
108. See Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Greiser v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 351
F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1965) (law firm alleging defendant settled directly with client and therefore
prevented firm from collecting contingent fee not permitted to recover because proof of
attorney-client relationship was insufficient); Frazier v. Boccardo, 70 Cal. App. 3d 331, 138
Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct. App. 1977) (facts present sufficient evidence for one law firm to proceed
against second firm which allegedly tortiously interfered with a contingent fee client contract);
Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809 (1969) (a group of
93 attorneys may not maintain a class action against an insurance company for interference
with contractual relations involving 88 clients); Krause v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
331 Mich. Rep. 19, 49 N.W.2d 41 (1951) (insurance company did not interfere with attorney's
client contract because the company was lawfully asserting a privilege); see also Herman, 41
I1l. 2d at 473, 244 N.E.2d at 811-12 (citing additional attorney fee cases).
109. See supra note 108 (citing Dombey, Herman, and Krause).
110. See Frazier v. Boccardo, 70 Cal. App. 3d 331, 138 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct. App. 1977).
111. Id. Frazier holds this situation creates a jury question concerning the existence of a
prima facie interference action. Id.
112. 23 Edw. III (1349). See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Contracts terminable-
at-will are not strictly enforceable. "[T]raditional contract remedies may seem less satisfactory
in [these] cases than elsewhere . . . . If no fixed term is expressed, no remedy for breach of
contract is available because no breach occurs." Perlman, supra note 4, at 85. See also supra
note 57.
113. See A.S. Rampel, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 2 A.D.2d 739, 740, 153 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (App.
Div. 1956) ("[t]here is no rule of law, however, in tort or in contract, which fixes liability upon
a defendant for procuring, with economic self-interest, a termination of at-will relationships, in
the absence of other unlawful or tortious acts").
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nable- at-will as business relations. Yet some judicial prejudice against
this type of action remains.
For example, in Lockewill, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp, 14 the
plaintiff had contracted with a shoe company to be its exclusive dis-
tributor in St. Louis.' 15 The contract was terminable-at-will, because
it was oral and of indefinite duration. 1 6 Several years later the shoe
company allowed a St. Louis department store to distribute the same
line of shoes."I7 The plaintiff distributor then sued the company for
breach of contract and the department store for tortious interference
with contract relations.' " The court denied the contract claim and
held that the terminable-at-will agreement was invalid after a reason-
able period.' ' 9 The court disposed of the interference with contract
relations claim, and upheld the lower court's verdict without examin-
ing any of the legal or factual issues involved. 2 °
Other courts have more thoroughly considered allegations of
interference with terminable-at-will contracts, even when the facts
seemed no more meritorious than those in Lockewill. 2' The court in
Ahern v. Boeing Co.,' 22 for example, held that a plaintiff stated a
prima facie interference claim under facts almost identical to those in
Lockewill. 23 In Ahern, the plaintiff had an exclusive terminable-at-
will' 24 agreement to distribute a unique incinerator.'25 The other
114. 547 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 1026-27.
116. Id. at 1027. "The [oral] agreement was silent as to its duration and nothing was said
about the right of either side to terminate the arrangement either with or without notice or
with or without cause." Id. Under applicable law, where a "distributorship agreement ... is
silent as to duration and ... does not deal specifically with termination ... , the agreement is
construed to be terminable at the will of either party." Id. at 1028-29.
117. Id. at 1025.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1029.
120. Id. at 1030.
121. See, e.g., Ahern v. Boeing Co., 701 F.2d 142 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (Plaintiff stated a prima
facie tortious interference with business relations case against defendant, although the alleged
business relation was terminable-at-will.); Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982) (allowing injunction to prevent former employees-at-will from interfering with
plaintiff's customer relations by using the same customer list); Livoti v. Elston, 52 A.D.2d
444, 384 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that a contract that is unenforceable is
analogous to one terminable-at-will and may therefore be the basis for an interference claim).
But see A.S. Rampel, Inc., v. Hyster Co., 2 A.D.2d 739, 740, 153 N.Y.S.2d 176, 178 (App.
Div. 1956) (holding that no liability exists for interference with contracts terminable-at-will).
122. 701 F.2d 142 (lth Cir. 1983).
123. Compare 701 F.2d at 143 with 547 F.2d at 1026-27.
124. 701 F.2d at 143. "The court found that the joint venture agreement granted certain
marketing rights to the appellants, but that the contract was terminable-at-will by either party
on thirty days' notice." Id.
125. Id.
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party to the contract eventually allowed a third party, the Ahern
defendant, to distribute the incinerator. 26 The plaintiff sued under a
tortious interference theory. 2 7 Although the appellate court upheld a
factual finding that the defendant's motives were merely "competitive
interests"'' 28 and not "ill will," '29 the court found that the plaintiff
stated a prima facie case. The court held that under applicable law
the relevant test looks to the defendant's active inducement, and not
to the defendant's motive. The court thus enforced a test seemingly
more stringent than the Lumley malice standard.
These cases suggest that even courts in recent holdings seem con-
fused as to the role and applicable standards of the interference torts
in the context of modem business relations. 30 Interference case opin-
ions will necessarily diverge to some degree, first, because all of these
cases must rely heavily on their particular facts and, second, because,
as a tort, interference actions are subject to the vagaries of each state's
law. 1 3 ' The current law is sufficiently confused to make business deal-
ings unpredictable. This confusion also tends to broaden the applica-
bility of interference torts. The interference torts therefore should be
limited in some way.132
III. CONTRACT LAW IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERFERENCE
ACTIONS: THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
A. The Tort Law Conception of Contract
Because the interference actions are in tort, they have tradition-
ally imposed a tort law view of contracts. 3 That is, under the inter-
ference torts a contract right is analogous to a property right. This
view extends at least as far back as Lumley v. Gye. 134 Under this view,
a party entering a contract does not limit his rights to those arising
from the contract itself. The very act of contracting spontaneously
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 144.
129. Id.
130. See generally Perlman, supra note 4, at 61 (arguing that in the area of the interference
torts, "doctrinal confusion is pervasive, both within and among jurisdictions").
131. See supra notes 4, 44 and 130.
132. See supra notes 4 and 44.
133. Perlman, supra note 4, at 62 ("Courts have paid too little attention to the interplay of
tort and contract policies and the proper role of each in resolving interference cases .. ").
134. Note, supra note 24, at 1524 ("[A]ccording to Lumley, breach of a contractual promise
is a violation of property rights"). See generally Comment, Analysis of the Formation of
Property Rights Underlying Tortious Interference With Contracts and Other Economic
Relations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1116 (1983) (describing the property rights concept as it relates
to the interference torts).
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creates an intangible piece of property which everyone not a party to
the contract must respect or else pay damages. 35 Thus, although the
contract interference cause of action is in tort, it changes the very
concept of what a contract is. As the Lumley court apparently recog-
nized, to allow the tort is to consider "[i]ntangible property created by
the promise of performance in a contract ... as worthy of protection
as physical property already created by labor or transferred by
inheritance."
' 13 6
Although equating contractual rights with property rights
appears contrary to the philosophy of common law contract law,' 37 to
argue against the validity of the interference with contract tort on this
ground would be ill advised. Whether a contract consists primarily of
property aspects is an insoluble jurisprudential puzzle. It is not an
issue that can be conclusively proved.
The question here concerns the validity of the interference torts.
Modern opinion combines both interference torts as one action.
138
This view is commonly considered too broad.'39 The general notion
that interference with contract is the more justified action,"4 how-
ever, is based only in tort law. Because interference is a tort, the rele-
vant tort relationship is that between the plaintiff and defendant. In
the context of the interference action, the second party to the contract
is a third party.' 4 ' Yet in order to impose a workable limit on the
interference torts, it is crucial to distinguish the contract from tort
aspects and policies. 42 Because debating the property character of
contracts leads only to speculation, the remaining issues are those
which concern torts and contracts.
135. Note, supra note 24, at 1524. The author has elsewhere discussed the vagueness of the
conception of what is "property." Dowling, General Propositions and Concrete Cases: The
Search for a Standard in the Conflict between Individual Property Rights and the Social
Interest, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 353, 358-65 (1985).
136. See supra note 135.
137. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461-64 (1897) (suggesting
that a contract is ideally no more than a choice to breach or pay damages).
138. See supra notes 19 and 20.
139. See supra notes 33 and 34.
140. See supra notes 33 and 34.
141. In fact, the defendant must be the third party because the prima facie tort prohibits a
plaintiff from suing the second party in tort. See infra note 216 and supra note 17.
142. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 62 (arguing that "courts have paid too little attention to
the" conflict of tort and contract policies in this area). But see Sayre, supra note 8, at 686
(arguing against limiting the interference torts on the basis of protecting contract law).
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B. The Economic Perspective of the Interference Actions
1. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONTRACT
Hornbook contract law arguably exists only in theory. 43 Never-
theless, the contract theory is valid if only because lawyers accept it.
According to Professor Gilmore, "generations of lawyers and judges
and law professors grew up believing that the theory was true-and it
is our beliefs, however absurd, that condition our actions.
'144
f the originators of this contract theory, Justice Holmes,
145
believed that a contract was a legal right or duty inextricably bound
up with "the consequences of its breach." 14 6 To Justice Holmes a
contract or other legal duty "is nothing but a prediction that if a man
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this way or
that by judgment of the court .... ,,"47 Grounding his reasoning in
a 1675 opinion by Lord Coke,1 48 Justice Holmes saw a contract as a
relationship which merely obligated a party to make a choice. 149 He
joined Lord Coke in objecting to the idea that there exists some
moral, noneconomic imperative requiring parties to keep their con-
tracts. 5 ° Modem writers on legal economics, such as Professor Pos-
ner, agree Justice Holmes's contract thesis continues to be valid.151
2. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONTRACT AND THE
INTERFERENCE ACTIONS
In their major writings, neither Justice Holmes nor Judge Posner
applied this economic theory of contract to tortious interference with
143. See G. GILMORE, supra note 57, at 18 ("[lIn its 'pure' form the [Contract Law] theory
may never have existed outside the classrooms of the Harvard Law School.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 13-17. For a general discussion of Justice Holmes's impact on contract, see
Sharp, Mr. Justice Holmes.: Some Modern Views-Contracts, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 268 (1964).
146. Holmes, supra note 137, at 458.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 462 (citing Bromage v. Genning, 81 Eng. Rep. 540 (1675) (Coke, J.) (addressing
a landlord/tenant contract and holding that "ceo voilt subverter l'entent del' convenantor,
quaint il intend a estre al son election a perder les damages ou a faire le leas")).
149. Holmes, supra note 137, at 462.
150. Id. Justice Holmes realized that his "mode of looking at the matter stinks in the
nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can." Id.
To Justice Holmes, however, these ethics-oriented thinkers have "been misled." Id. Justice
Holmes's economic analysis of breach seems to have prevailed. Probably for this reason
"punitive damages are not awarded in contract actions, no matter how malicious the breach."
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 520 (2d ed. 1977).
151. R. POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88 (2d ed. 1977); Birmingham, Breach




contract. 52 Nonetheless, the extension is inviting. Under the Holmes
model, a party may either perform or breach, but he will normally
breach only when to do so is cheaper than to perform. 5 3 This,
according to Professor Posner, is the economic ideal because it will
produce the most economically efficient behavior and the least eco-
nomic waste.'54 When some chance exists that the breaching party
will not be responsible at all on the contract, however, the party's
economic forecast drastically changes.
For example, in a standard sales situation suppose seller S con-
tracts with buyer B to sell ten widgets at ten dollars each. Before
delivery, the widget market rises ten percent, and X offers to buy each
of S's ten widgets for eleven dollars. Under traditional sales contract
damage theory, as codified in the Uniform Commercial Code,' 5 if S
sold to X, he would not realize any more money than if he had sold to
B. S would initially gain ten dollars on the sale to X, but he would
owe these dollars, the difference between the market price and the
contract price, t5 6 to B.
To keep transaction costs and ill-will at a minimum, S in this
situation would almost certainly perform his contract. Once S con-
siders the element of tortious interference with contract, however, his
assessment of the situation changes by the probability that B will sue
X instead of S. Assume that because of X's greater financial strength,
S calculates there is a fifty percent chance that B would choose X as a
defendant over S.I57 Then S has a real choice. He can either perform
on the contract or he can sell to X and take his chances. S realizes
$100 on the first choice, but his average realization on the second
152. Justice Holmes does not address the tort in The Path of the Law, supra note 140, and
Judge Posner does not address it in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 155.
Justice Holmes once had occasion to decide an interference-like action, and he predictably
took a restrictive view of the concept. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303,
308 (1927) (The plaintiff's' action "must be worked out through their contract relations with
the owners, not on the postulate that they have a [property] right in rem.').
153. See R. POSNER, supra note 151, at 88 ("[I]n many cases it is uneconomical to induce
the completion of a contract after it has been breached .... "); Perlman, supra note 4, at 80
("breach will occur only when the promisor can gain enough from the alternative opportunity
to buy out the promisee and have some additional gain left over").
154. R. POSNER, supra note 151, § 4.9, at 88-93.
155. See U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -716 (1977); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 150, at
546-49.
156. U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (1977).
157. In reality, the odds that B will sue X may be even greater than 50% due to the greater
damages available in tort. "[T]he existence of an enhanced damages measure makes it more
likely that the promisee will sue the inducer rather than the promisor." Perlman, supra note
4, at 88. See also infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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choice is $105 (actually, $100 or $110, depending on whom B sues)."58
This situation will make S more likely to breach, which is precisely
contrary to the raison d'etre of the interference with contract tort.1
5 9
Of course, the counter-argument is that, given the existence of
the interference with contract action, X will be less likely to offer to
buy S's widgets. In practice this objection is weak for several reasons.
First, a look at the cases shows that S, the party under contract, likely
has more information about the relationship and about his con-
tract. 160 The third party's (X's) lack of information would logically
tend to make him underestimate the probability of his being sued for
tortious interference.16' The rate of successful interference cases in
society is probably low enough to make the odds of any single plaintiff
filing a claim too idiosyncratic to measure. Further, if the third party
did have enough information to consider the likelihood of a suit he
might rely too heavily on the strength of a "lawful competition" privi-
lege.' 62 The prevalent attitude in the American business community
seems to be that competition is an inherent part of the free enterprise
system and, thus, is not actionable.
63
3. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONTRACT AND INTERFERENCE
TORT DAMAGES
The existence of a cause of action for interference with contract
could lead to more breached contracts, which is contrary to the socie-
tal ideal'" and contrary to the purpose of the interference tort
itself. 165 Another drawback of the tort, also based on the goal of soci-
158. For a discussion of the possible problem of double recovery, see infra notes 170, 171
and accompanying text.
159. Note, supra note 33, at 1493 (arguing that courts have "adopted an implicit
assumption that the tort's sole raison d'etre is to protect the individual interests of particular
plaintiff's"). See infra note 205.
160. See, e.g., Studley v. Gulf Oil Corp., 386 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1967) (where a broker
plaintiff had almost all the relevant information, but the third party to the brokerage contract
did not even know of the plaintiff's existence).
161. Perlman, supra note 4, at 85 (arguing that the unpredictability of tort damages as
compared to contract complicates negotiation over liability between the inducer and
breacher).
162. For citations to detailed discussions of this privilege, see supra note 43.
163. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 78-79:
It is startling that doctrine of this sort [i.e., the interference action] is
superimposed on an economic order committed to competition. As one member
of the American Law Institute observed in the debate over Dean Prosser's draft
on tortious interference for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), foreign lawyers
reading the RESTATEMENT as an original matter would find it astounding that
the whole competitive order of American industry is prima facie illegal.
164. See supra note 159.
165. See supra note 159.
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etal economic efficiency, is the problem of damages. Damages in con-
tract are strictly defined, and this definition protects Justice Holmes's
ideal of economic freedom to breach or not to breach. Contract reme-
dies are meant only to put the injured party in as good a position as he
would have been in had the other party performed. 6 6 Unlike tort
theory, contract theory generally does not allow consequential, spe-
cial, or punitive damages, unless specifically provided for in the
contract. 
67
Adding the element of tortious interference with contract, how-
ever, throws off the delicate contract damage system. The cases show
that once a victim of a breached contract can collect tort damages, he
can actually be better off than he would have been had the contract
been honored. 68 Under tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff
can even collect punitive damages.' 69 Also, because courts consider
the interference and the breach to be independent wrongs, the tort
creates the "spectre" of double recovery. 170 This problem goes back
at least as far as Lumley v. Gye, where the plaintiff theater owner sued
both the opera singer and the other theater owner.' 71 If a plaintiff
could succeed in each suit, his contract would in effect be paid off
twice, which would create an economic loss to society of the value of
the second judgment.
166. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1977); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 150, at 521-22.
167. See supra note 166.
168. For a classic example of this circumstance, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Aurora
Air Serv., Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Alaska 1979) (because the interference actions are
intentional torts, they are subject to tort damage awards, including punitive damages).
169. Id.
170. Dade Enters. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 73, 160 So. 209, 210 (1935)
(dictum allowing plaintiff to sue both on contract and in tort against third party); Mitchell v.
Weiger, 56 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 371 N.E.2d 888, 892 (App. Ct. 1977) (holding that "[w]here
a third party influences a contracting party to breach his contract, the innocent contracting
party has a right of action against both the other contracting party and a right in tort against
the third party"); Katz v. Thompson, 19 Misc. 2d 848, 851, 189 N.Y.S.2d 982, 985 (Co. Ct.
1959) (rejecting defendant's argument that the interference plaintiff suffered no damages as
long as he had an enforceable contract right against the second party to the contract). But see
Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 351 F.2d 121, 125
(6th Cir. 1965) (requiring that the interference plaintiff exhaust contract remedies); Krause v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 24, 49 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1951) (requiring that
the interference plaintiff exhaust contract remedies).
171. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852). The plaintiff sued the singer
unsuccessfully for specific performance on the singing contract. Id. at 689-90. See Lumley v.
Wagner, 64 Eng. Rep. 1209, 1211-12 (1852).
A fascinating aspect of the Lumley holding, but beyond the scope of this discussion,
concerns the effect this earlier litigation had on the outcome of Lumley v. Gye. The same
parties had been litigating intensively the same factual problem before the same court. Did
this have an effect when the plaintiff at last came to phrase the issue as interference with
contract?
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The purpose of entering a contract is to assure recovery in the
event a situation does not turn out as planned. 72 The odds that a
party will perform on a contract are an integral part of the transaction
itself. The classic example of this is the simple loan, where a debtor
with a better credit rating (that is, a party more likely to perform)
pays less interest. The reason a party fails to perform is not an
independent economic factor. 17 Whether someone fails to pay a loan
because he loses his job or because a third party, knowing of the con-
tract, swindles him out of his money is economically irrelevant.' 7 4 In
making the loan the creditor must take into account the debtor's
potential for default. The debtor's susceptibility to negative third
party influence is simply an additional factor.
175
Further, in almost any breach of contract situation there is likely
to be some third party, if only a spouse, involved in the breaching
party's decisions. 176 Under current law, if this third party knew of the
contract and was solvent enough to make an interference suit worth-
while, the other contracting party would likely have an action against
him.
IV. LIMITING THE INTERFERENCE TORTS: THE UNLAWFUL
MEANS TEST AND BEYOND
A. The Unlawful Means Test
In outlining the historical rise and the economic factors of the
interference torts, much of the foregoing analysis has supported the
proposition that intentional interference with business relations is
more strongly based in economic logic than is interference with con-
tract, largely because the plaintiff in the latter action has available a
remedy he himself created. An article by Professor Harvey Perl-
172. See Holmes, supra note 137, at 462 ("It]he duty to keep a contract means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else").
173. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 90 ("[I]f contract doctrine allows a contracting party to
avoid an agreement when that party discovers a better deal, it should not matter that the
information about the better deal is provided by a third party .
174. Id.
175. A Supreme Court of Illinois decision supports the theory behind this debt analogy by
arguing that its holding against an interference plaintiff is just because the plaintiff entered a
risky venture which could have turned out profitably for him. Swager v. Couri, 77 Ill. 2d 173,
192-93, 395 N.E.2d 921, 929 (1979) ("[Iln the hope of earning a very substantial fee, the
plaintiff's took a very substantial risk on the success of a highly speculative venture, and on
the character of the defendants. That their judgment apparently was wrong on both counts is
not a basis for liability in tort.").
176. Perlman, supra note 4, at 62 ("a person's economic relationships are so numerous and
so independent with the activities of others that some interference is inevitable").
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man, 77 which is a leading economic discussion of the interference
torts, proposes that these two actions be limited by a standard called
the "unlawful means test."'178 Following is an explanation of this test,
and a proposed expansion of it, based on the notion that the interfer-
ence torts are conceptually distinct, and that interference with busi-
ness relations, the more historically and economically sound action,
deserves stronger protection under any proposed limit on the torts.
Professor Perlman's unlawful means test attempts to replace the
less definite Lumley v. Gye malice standard'7 9 as a limit on the inter-
ference torts.8 0 The test is rooted in an economically sound ration-
ale, but its application to interference with contract is overbroad
because it allows a plaintiff a remedy that is superfluous to his already
existing action in contract.1
8'
The test, in a limited degree, exists in some jurisdictions
already."8 2 It divides interference cases into two categories-those in
which the defendant's interference was otherwise lawful, and those in
which the defendant's act itself was independently wrongful.'8 3 The
test in general proposes that if the defendant could be liable for a fully
independent tort, such as fraud, libel, or an antitrust violation, the law
should encourage the plaintiff to take the direct route and sue under
that tort. 
84
Because most other torts do not traditionally deal with purely
economic damages, the unlawful means test recognizes that some situ-
ations may more appropriately fit within the interference torts.8 5
The structure of the interference actions, also, may provide the plain-
tiff with a procedural advantage. 8 6 Although the prima facie cases of
many torts would require a plaintiff to show, for example, special
177. Perlman, supra note 4, at 65.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
181. See infra discussion.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 122-132 (discussing Ahem v. Boeing). For a
discussion of an unlawful means-type test in New York, see Note, supra note 33, at 1503-04.
Furthermore, Professor Perlman argues that the unlawful means test corresponds to the
results, if not the dictum, in many contemporary interference cases. Perlman, supra note 4, at
199 (arguing the unlawful means analysis "closely ... reflects the outcomes in decided
cases"). See generally infra note 191.
183. Perlman, supra note 4, at 62.
184. Id. at 69, 70, 126.
185. Id. at 70-76.
186. Id. at 77. Of course, retaining the plaintiff's burden of proving the defendant's
independent unlawful behavior would effectively abolish the interference torts, because any
plaintiff who could meet this burden could proceed under the independent action and would
have no need for the interference tort.
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damages, 8 7 under the interference torts once the plaintiff shows the
defendant's intent, which usually amounts only to a showing that the
defendant acted knowing of the contract or relationship, 88 the burden
of explanation more readily shifts to the defendant. 89
This phenomenon remains intact under the unlawful means test.
The test requires, however, that a court focus on the question of
whether the defendant used economic power in an independently
unlawful way to affect an existing contract or business relationship. 90
Because the focus of the tort itself has become the lawfulness of the
competition, this eliminates the need for a defendant's privilege of
lawful competition.' 9'
B. Economic Justification of the Unlawful Means Test
At first this unlawful means test may seem an unusually strict
limit on the plaintiff's interference action, but the outcomes of actual
reported interference cases apparently follow the predicted outcome
under the test rather closely.' 92  The unlawful means test 193 is
grounded in a thorough economic analysis; 194 however, a reasoned
examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion. Briefly, the policy underlying the test derives from Justice
Holmes's concept that the law attaches no stigma or special sanction
to a contracting party who for economic reasons chooses to breach.' 95
If breaching a contract is not itself blameworthy, then "[t]o hold an
inducer liable, his behavior must be at least as culpable as that of the
breaching promisor; to impose a liability rule more onerous than that
imposed on the promisor, the inducer must be more culpable."'
196
This "more culpable" standard requires independent unlawful-
ness. An interference defendant under this test will be liable only
187. Perlman, supra note 4, at 77.
188. See supra note 17.
189. Perlman, supra note 4, at 77.
190. Id. at 110.
191. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Dean Prosser's argument that the
unlawful means test exists to some degree as a limit on the defendant's lawful competition
privilege. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 129, at 936-37 ("[M]ethods which are tortious in
themselves, such as violence, threats of intimidation, defamation, misrepresentations, the
counterfeiting of a product, bribery, or the harassing of agents, will not be privileged even
where the defendant is acting for a purpose justifiable in itself.").
192. See Perlman, supra note 4, at 97-128. Part III of Professor Perlman's discussion is a
detailed proof of the thesis that outcomes in decided cases closely reflect the unlawful means
analysis. See generally supra note 182.
193. Note that the test does exist, to some degree, in some jurisdictions. See supra note 186.
194. See Perlman, supra note 4, Part II, at 69-97.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 143-151.
196. Perlman, supra note 4, at 93.
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when his act of interference was independently tortious, given that in
assessing whether an act is independently unlawful a court may go
beyond the relatively strict bounds of traditional tort law.
197
C. Expanding the Unlawful Means Test
Professor Perlman's unlawful means test ignores the fundamen-
tal distinction between interference with contract and interference
with business relations, 98 which has been the subject of the previous
sections of this discussion. Both the historical rise of the torts and
their economic basis militate for the argument that society should
protect the business relations action and restrict the tort of interfer-
ence with enforceable contracts. Professor Perlman's unlawful means
test ultimately proves inadequate because it does not recognize this
distinction.1 99 A more comprehensive test would require a two-step
analysis. First, discern whether an enforceable contract exists; and
second, apply one of two standards-a stricter one for valid contracts
and a looser one for business relations.
What these two standards should be, specifically is of course a
question of the policy of each jurisdiction. One suggestion would be
entirely to abolish actions for interference with enforceable contracts,
and force plaintiffs to sue third parties under whatever independent
tort the plaintiff could prove. If a plaintiff could show no enforceable
contract existed, only then he could sue under interference with busi-
ness relations, as modified by Professor Perlman's unlawful means
test. Under this theory, first, the plaintiff would have the burden of
proving first that no enforceable contract existed and, second, that the
defendant intended to interfere with the plaitiff's relationship. The
burden would then shift to the defendant to prove that he did not
commit any civil or criminal wrong.
A plaintiff suing under interference with business relations who
could show both tort and contract damages, and who could show suf-
ficient injury, might then be in a position to recover twice. The sec-
ond recovery would be justified because existing noninterference law
sees the plaintiff as the victim of two separate wrongs. 20°
197. See id. at 98.
198. See id. at 82-85.
199. See id.
200. The analysis is the same as if a plaintiffrecovered for the breach of a contract and for a
separate tort committed by a third party during the same transaction.
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1. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR THE RECOMMENDED
EXPANSION OF THE UNLAWFUL MEANS TEST
In his economic analysis of the unlawful means test, Professor
Perlman's own justification supports the thesis that the test, as stated,
is too lenient for the interference with contract actions.20' In analyz-
ing the reasons for limiting the interference with contract action, Pro-
fessor Perlman lists three main economic arguments.20 2 Each of these
arguments actually rejects all interference liability, except where a
plaintiff can independently prove a separate tort. Professor Perlman's
first argument is that the policy behind the interference actions con-
tradicts the tenet of contract law which allows the breach of a con-
tract when it is the most economically efficient alternative. The
interference action discourages all breaches, even those which would
maximize efficiency.20 3
Although in practice the interference actions may not in fact
achieve this policy,20 4 preventing breaches is certainly the goal behind
these torts. 20 1 This policy conflict goes to the heart of the interference
with contract action. Because it allows a plaintiff under a contract to
rely on interference with contract, Professor Perlman's unlawful
means test limits, but does not eliminate this problem. Only a
requirement that the plaintiff shoulder the burden of proof of an
entirely independent tort would reconcile this situation. 0 6 This argu-
ment against liability cannot apply to interference with business rela-
tions because the contract law policy of supporting efficient breaches
does not extend to informal noncontract relationships.
Professor Perlman's second and third arguments for instituting
the unlawful means test similarly urge a complete limit on the tort.
Neither of these arguments applies as forcefully to the interference
with business relations action. Professor Perlman's second argument
contends that liability for interference with contract increases the
transaction costs between a would-be inducer and a would-be
breacher of a contract. The uncertainty as to which party will be sued
increases the transaction costs relating to how the parties allocate the
201. Perlman, supra note 4, at 82-85.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 83 ("[C]ontract rules seem designed to facilitate breach where efficiency gains
result; the inducer liability rule, in contrast, seems designed to reduce the number of such
breaches and thus runs counter to a plausible objective of contract doctrine.").
204. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 159 and 203.
206. In fairness, a plaintiff alleging interference with an enforceable contract should have




amount which the plaintiff might eventually recover.20 7 Professor
Perlman's third argument is that interference with contract liability
will increase negotiation and salvage costs because of the communica-
tion problems among the three parties.20 '
Although both these arguments may seem rather trivial, both
support the recommendation that the courts eliminate interference
liability for enforceable contracts. Surprisingly, Professor Perlman
seems to address and support this point.2"9 Further, neither of these
two arguments is as compelling when applied to interference with
business relations, because when no formal contract exists, transac-
tion costs and comunication problems are less affected by any original
two-party relationship.
The economic rationale for limiting the interference actions
depends largely upon the existence of a contract. When Professor
Perlman argues to apply the unlawful means test to the business rela-
tions action,210 he has little economic logic to rely on and his argu-
ment is correspondingly shorter.211 The thrust of his analysis is that
given the economic reasons for limiting interference with contract and
because a contract is necessarily more worthy of protection than is a
mere business relation, a business relations action must take prece-
dence over a contract action.21 2
The three preceding sections have been wholly devoted to dispel-
ling this tort law view of the interference actions. The pre-Lumley v.
Gye common law demonstrated that courts protected business rela-
tions long before they came to protect contracts. At the time the
courts took this step, they faced the objection that to do so would
undermine contract law.213 An economic analysis also shows con-
tract law depends on the notion that by contracting, a party creates a
remedy for itself in case its transaction does not proceed as
planned.21 4 To indiscriminately treat a contract as a chattel which a
third party can violate is to allow the victim of a breach of contract a
choice of defendants. The very existence of this choice affects the
207. Perlman, supra note 4, at 83-84.
208. Id. at 84-85.
209. Id. at 84. The transaction costs related to allocation of liability, of course, "would be
eliminated in the absence of liability." Id.
210. Id. at 89.
211. Compare Perlman, supra note 4, § 2, at 82 with Perlman, supra note 4, § 5, at 89.
212. Perlman, supra note 4, at 90-91 ("[I]f the efficiency principles of contract law suggest
that a third party using lawful means should not be liable for inducing breach of enforceable
promises, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to unenforceable expectancies.").
213. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text (discussing Aldridge v. Stuveysant); notes
86-102 and accompanying text (discussing Lumley v. Gye).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 143-51.
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common law of contract. For this reason, courts do not allow a party
to a contract to sue in tort the other party to the contract. That the
interference torts can provide greater damages than can breach of
contract compounds this problem.2" 5
This analysis undermines Professor Perlman's assumption that
the economic policies behind the interference with contract action
apply even more strongly to interference with business relations. The
unlawful means test is a rational policy as it applies to interference
with business relations because it allows a plaintiff with no other rem-
edy some chance to proceed against a third party who has committed
a wrong against him. When a plaintiff has arranged for a course of
recovery by forming a contract, however, the law should not provide
any alternate remedy against another defendant, if the alternate rem-
edy, like tortious interference, arises from the same contract.
A plaintiff who has provided himself with the protection of a
contract always has available both his remedy in contract against the
second party and the common law noninterference tort actions
against all third parties. If a third party's actions rise to the level of
any other tort, the plaintiff who could show sufficient damages might
even proceed against two parties, one in tort and one in contract,
without creating any ideological problem.
2. THE LOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE RECOMMENDED
EXPANSION OF THE UNLAWFUL MEANS TEST
The foregoing analysis has concentrated on economic arguments
showing the interference torts are ideologically suspect where they
conflict with principles of contract law. An economic argument
alone, however, seems insufficient to overcome a hundred-year line of
tort cases. Because of the unique nature of interference torts, a logi-
cal, policy-oriented analysis proves useful in examining these issues
and testing the recommended extension of the unlawful means test.
In a two-party breach of contract, the victim of the breach can-
not bring an interference action against the other contracting party,
even if that other party's behavior satisfies all the elements of the
prima facie interference case.216 The prima facie interference case
requires that the defendant be a third party to the contract. 27 There-
215. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
216. Ryan v. Brooklyn Eye & Ear Hosp., 46 A.D.2d 87, 91, 360 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (App.
Div. 1974) ("[T]he plaintiff may not assert a cause against the [contracting party] for inducing
the breach of a contract right which could only have come from the [contracting party] in the
first place."). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 129, at 934 ("[T]he defendant's breach of
his own contract with the plaintiff is of course not a basis for the tort."). See supra note 141.
217. See supra notes 17, 141, and 216.
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fore, the same acts and states of mind amount to a tort if a third party
commits them, but not if a contracting party does.218  This rule is
essential to prevent all contract actions from instantly being brought
in tort. In its absence, the only nontortious breach of contract would
probably be an "unintentional breach."2 9
The interference action is, therefore, analogous to criminal solici-
tation; current law makes a "solicitation" tortious while the principal
act-breach of contract-is no tort at all.220 This phenomenon makes
the interference action suspect as a traditional tort, and the issue of
damages heightens the disparity. The "solicitor" or interferer is sub-
ject to actual damages under tort law, while the "principal" or
breacher receives protection from the limited damages available under
the contract.
Professor Perlman's unlawful means test attempts to reconcile
this by insuring that the "solicitation" will be of an independently
actionable nature.22' The recommended extension of the test would
require that if the "principal" breached an enforceable contract, the
"solicitor" could be liable only if his solicitation amounted to an
actual tort, for which he would be liable anyway.
This is where the criminal law analogy breaks down: although a
criminal solicitor might be held liable for the crimes of the
principal,222 breaching a contract is a business decision, and trying to
influence another's business decision does not seem as blameworthy as
soliciting another to commit a crime. Yet present law penalizes the
influencer even more than it punishes the decisionmaker himself.223
Therefore, tort damages should be available only in cases of interfer-
ence with business relations where the plaintiff has no alternate rem-
edy. Where the plaintiff does not have an enforceable contract, only
one of two parties, the defendant or the interferer, could conceivably
be liable, and a policy question arises as to which of these should bear
the loss. Under the expanded unlawful means test, the interferer will
be liable if he cannot meet his burden under Professor Perlman's
218. See supra note 216.
219. Even an "unintentional breach" might conceivably be actionable in a jurisdiction
which recognizes negligent interference with business relations. See infra note 232 and
accompanying text.
220. See supra note 216.
221. For a discussion of the Holmes theory of contract damages and its effect on
interference actions, see supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text.
222. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT-r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 58, at 414-23 (1972).
If party A solicits C to kill B, and C does kill B, "[u]nder either the common law concept of
accessory before the fact or modem principles of accountability, A is also guilty of murder."
Id. at 414 n.1.
223. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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unlawful means analysis. Not meeting this burden will necessarily
show that the interferer is more at fault than the defendant, and there-
fore should bear the plaintiff's loss. In all other situations, either the
breacher of the enforceable contract will be legally liable, or the
inducer will be liable under an independent tort.
3. CONDITIONAL CONTRACTS
A quirk in this analysis arises in a conditional contract where a
third party, the defendant, prevents the condition from occurring.
Because a conditional contract is legally valid,224 this situation would
traditionally fall under interference with contract. Because the condi-
tion never occurred, however, the plaintiff would have no enforceable
remedy in contract against the contracting party. The plaintiff's prac-
tical position is identical to that of a plaintiff suing under interference
with business relations. In this situation the plaintiff should have
available the interference action, as modified by the unlawful means
test.
Richardson v. La Rancherita2" is a good example. The Richard-
son plaintiff was an unsuccessful restauranteur who decided to get
out of his business. He contracted to sell his restaurant, but the con-
tract was conditioned upon the plaintiff obtaining his landlord's con-
sent to assign the lease of the building. 226 The landlord, who wanted
to raise the rent, would not consent, so the plaintiff sued him for
intentional interference with the restaurant sale contract. 227
Although a valid conditional contract existed, it was not enforceable.
These circumstances are analytically closer to an interference
with business relations action because the alleged interference relates
directly to the condition on which the validity of the contract turned.
The effect for the plaintiff is the same as if no valid contract had
existed. Thus, the plaintiff in a Richardson-type situation should be
able to invoke the interference action, as modified by the unlawful
means test.
V. CONCLUSION
The expansion of the unlawful means test rests on the thesis that
the plaintiff in an interference with contract action has an alternate
remedy which he himself created; therefore, his alleged injury is less
224. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 150, at 383-84.
225. Richardson v. La Rancherita of La Jolla, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 3d 73, 159 Cal. Rptr. 285
(Ct. App. 1979).




worthy of legal protection than is the injury involved in interference
with valid business relations. Although the law does not generally
favor restricting the scope of torts,228 the example of heart-balm legis-
lation is relevant in this area because it abolishes intentional interfer-
ence with personal contracts and relations.2 29  This family law
solution of totally abrogating the action would seem overbroad in a
business context because additional reasons to abolish these family
law torts exist which do not apply to business contexts.23°
Finding an appropriate standard for the business torts is diffi-
cult. Standards in the existing cases are not uniform.231 In fact, one
jurisdiction has abolished the intent requirement and allowed an
action for negligent interference.232 The situation therefore demands
a uniform limit on the torts. In searching for this limit the history of
the actions demonstrates that interference with business relations is
older and more logically justified than is interference with contract;
an economic analysis seems to support this idea.233
This is true notwithstanding the contemporary notion that the
contract action is more worthy of protection because the alleged
injury is more definite.23a In fashioning this thesis into a workable
limit, the framework of the unlawful means test proves useful.235
Once this test expands to restrict further the interference with con-
tract action, as the preceding historical and conceptual analysis
requires, a test emerges based both on an inquiry into the existence of
an enforceable contract and on the existence of independently tortious
behavior. This expanded test could provide a solution to the inade-
quacies of the interference torts.
228. Dobbs, supra note 4, at 357 ("[Clourts have been in an expansive mood for a long
time.").
229. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14.
231. See generally supra Part III.
232. The case chiefly cited for this proposition is J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,
598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). For general discussions of the negligent interference
action, see W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 129, at 938-42; id. at § 130, at 952; Note, Negligent
Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1964).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (denying liability for negligent
interference).
233. See generally supra Part III.
234. See generally supra Parts II and III.
235. See supra Part IV.
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